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78-4299/3

30 NOV 1978

Executive Registry
78-7240

STATINTL

Separate Memo alluded to in para 4 is on RT hand in this folder

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Document Classification

1. Action Requested: That you sign the attached memorandum for the NFIB on Executive Order 12065.

2. Background: The President signed Executive Order 12065 on National Security Information on 28 June 1978 and established standards that must be met for material to be classified. The driving force behind the Order was to strike an appropriate balance between the public's right to government information and the government's need to protect information which needs to be kept secret. You, as head of the Intelligence Community, have statutory responsibility to protect intelligence activities, sources and methods which must be kept classified. Also, you have, by commissioning the [] study, taken special cognizance of the need to get more intelligence information to consumers without sacrificing proper security needs.

STATINTL

3. The Executive Order is to become effective on 1 December 1978 and it is believed appropriate that you remind the NFIB members that you expect full compliance with both the letter and spirit of the Executive Order.


4. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum to the NFIB.

STATINTL


John F. Blake

Attachment

Coordination with



DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee



SECOM-D-413
28 NOV 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking
Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Chairman

SUBJECT: Community Guidance on Implementation of
E.O. 12065

STAT

1. Action requested: That you approve proposed security policy guidance to the National Foreign Intelligence Board regarding implementation of Executive Order 12065.

2. Background and discussion: E.O. 12065, which changes certain aspects of the security classification system, takes effect on 1 December 1978. Among other things, it requires agencies to promulgate guides to provide for the identification and uniform classification of information. The Order also requires that information classified for more than six years be the subject of a narrative reason for such extension.

E.O. 12036 - "United States Intelligence Activities" - makes the DCI responsible for ensuring the establishment by the Community of "common security standards" for intelligence information, and for providing policy guidance for the protection of sources and methods. Issuance of common classification guidance is supportive of this responsibility. The attached proposed memorandum is designed to:

a. Task NFIB members and program managers to develop classification guides with particular

reference to sources and methods and compartmented data. (This recognizes the unique familiarity that program managers have with the sensitivity of their data.)

b. Provide a set of Intelligence Community classification criteria to aid in the identification and protection of intelligence information and sources and methods. (The proposed criteria are modeled on those developed for CIA use.)


c. Require a copy of all Community classification guides to be provided to the Chairman, DCI Security Committee, "for review in support of responsibilities under E.O. 12036."

d. Require all compartmented data to be classified for the maximum period allowed under E.O. 12065, and to be reviewed then to determine any further needs for classification protection. (This all-inclusive approach would be subject to revision as shown proper by later, detailed reviews of compartmented programs.)

e. Provide a standardized narrative statement of reasons for extension of classification in the interests of uniform Community usage.

The review function assigned to the Security Committee will permit cross-program analysis and opportunity to standardize Community security procedures.

3. Recommendation: That you sign the attached proposed memorandum for the NFIB.


Robert W. Gambino

STATINTL

Attachment

21 DEC 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Intelligence Community Implementation of
Executive Order 12065

1. Executive Order 12065 became effective on 1 December 1978. It changes certain aspects of classifying and marking information. Intelligence Community agency heads and program managers/executive agents are enjoined to ensure that security policies and procedures under their cognizance are in accordance with the Order and the related "Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1 Concerning National Security Information." The Executive Order and Directive No. 1 take precedence over conflicting policies and procedures in existing Community directives and regulations to include DCID 1/7, DCID 1/19, and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) control directives, which will be revised as necessary.

2. Particular attention shall be given to the requirement in the Order to promulgate classification guides, especially with regard to SCI and to other information bearing on intelligence sources or methods. NFIB members and program managers/executive agents are responsible for developing such guides for the programs under their cognizance. As an interim measure, existing guides may be modified or summary guidance provided by message/cable format pending coordination and approval of final versions. The attachment lists categories of information which should be considered in preparing classification guides for Intelligence Community applications. A copy of all guides promulgated for foreign intelligence and foreign counter-intelligence shall be provided to the Chairman, DCI Security Committee for review in support of my responsibilities under E. O. 12036.

3. To ensure an adequate period of protection pending a detailed review of classification requirements, all SCI shall be annotated to show that it will be reviewed for declassification on a date 20 years from the date of the material (30 years in the case of Foreign Government Information as defined in the Order). The requirement for this annotation shall be included in guides for SCI. The reason for the extension of classification longer than six years may be shown for SCI or other intelligence information by use of the following, selecting the words or phrases applicable to the class or item of information involved:

"Reason - to protect sensitive (cryptologic/technical/human/clandestine) (sources/methods of collecting)/(means of processing) intelligence which are expected to remain sensitive because of (vulnerability to counteraction)/(loss of informational advantage to the United States) during the full period of classification."

4. Questions on these matters should be directed to the DCI Security Committee.

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

November 1978

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA

Information falling within one or more of the categories set forth below may be classified if its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause at least identifiable damage to the national security. These criteria are designed to aid in the identification of information produced by or for the Intelligence Community and its component elements which information is believed to require classification protection. Intelligence Community agencies should advise the DCI Security Committee of any information which does not meet any of these criteria but which they believe requires classification protection.

a. Military Plans, Weapons, or Operations

- (1) Intelligence Information concerning foreign military intentions, capabilities, or activities.
- (2) Information that could reveal the extent or degree of success achieved by the United States in the collection of intelligence information on and assessment of foreign military plans, weapons, capabilities, or operations.

b. Foreign Government Information

- (1) Intelligence information provided to the United States by any element of a foreign government, or international organization of governments, with the explicit or implicit understanding that the information is to be kept in confidence. This includes information revealing past, present, or proposed joint intelligence activities or facilities involving the United States or the nature thereof in foreign countries.
- (2) Intelligence information produced by the United States, whether unilaterally or jointly, with a foreign government or international organization of governments, pursuant to an arrangement with any element of such government

or organization evidenced by an exchange of letters, memorandum of understanding, or other written record and requiring that the information, the arrangement itself, or both be kept in confidence.

c. Intelligence Activities, Sources, or Methods

- (1) Information that could reveal or identify a present, past, or prospective intelligence source, whether a person, organization, group, technical system, mechanism, device, or any other means or instrument that provides, has provided, or is being developed to provide foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence.
- (2) Information which could reveal or identify a present, past, or prospective intelligence method, procedure, mode, technique, or requirement used or being developed to acquire, transmit, analyze, correlate, evaluate, or process foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence or to support an intelligence source, operation, or activity.
- (3) Information not officially released that could disclose the organizational structure of an Intelligence Community agency; the numbers and assignments of such agency's personnel; the size and composition of the budget for such agency or for all or any part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program; logistical and associated support activities and services; security procedures, techniques, and activities including those applicable to the fields of communications and data processing; or other quantitative or qualitative data that could reveal or indicate the nature, objectives, requirements, priorities, scope or thrust of any such agency activities, including the missions, functions and locations of such agency components or installations as are under any form of cover.
- (4) Information that could disclose the identities of Intelligence Community agency personnel operating under cover or of code designations used to protect such personnel or intelligence sources, methods, and activities.

- (5) Information not officially released that could reveal the identity, number, location, character, or skills of personnel covered under agreements between an Intelligence Community agency and other agencies of the United States Government, elements of foreign governments, or other entities.
- (6) Information pertaining to contractual relationships with private individuals, commercial concerns, or nongovernmental institutions and entities when such a relationship involves a specific intelligence interest, or reveals the extent or depth of knowledge or technical expertise possessed by an Intelligence Community agency, or when disclosure of the relationship could jeopardize the contractor's willingness or ability to provide services to such agency.
- (7) Information pertaining to intelligence-related methodologies, techniques, formulae, equipment, programs or models, including computer simulations, ranging from initial requirements through planning, source acquisition, contract initiation, research, design, and testing to production, personnel training, and operational use.
- (8) Information that could identify research, procedures, or data used in the acquisition and processing of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or the production of finished intelligence, when such identification could reveal a particular intelligence interest, the value of the intelligence, or the extent of knowledge of a particular subject of intelligence or counterintelligence interest.
- (9) Information that could disclose criteria and procedures for the handling of critical intelligence that could affect the national security of the United States or its allies and that requires the immediate attention of senior officials.

- (10) Information that could reveal, jeopardize, or compromise a cryptographic device, procedure, or system, or intelligence data resulting from the employment of such a device, procedure, or system, or the sites, facilities, systems, and technologies used or proposed for use in the collection, interpretation, evaluation, or dissemination of signals intelligence.
 - (11) Information that could reveal, jeopardize, or compromise a technical or mechanical device, procedure or system used or proposed for the collection of intelligence information, or the sites, facilities, equipment, systems, operational schedules and technologies used or proposed for use in such collection or in the interpretation, evaluation and dissemination of collected information.
 - (12) Information pertaining to training in intelligence sources, methods, and activities provided to individuals, organizations, or groups that could reveal or identify equipment, materials, training sites, methods and techniques of instruction, or the identities of students and instructors.
 - (13) Information not officially released that could disclose Intelligence Community agency policies and procedures used for personnel recruitment, assessment, selection, training, assignment, and evaluation.
- d. Foreign Relations or Foreign Activities of the United States
- (1) Intelligence information that, if disclosed, could lead to foreign political, economic, or military action against the United States or other nations.
 - (2) Intelligence information that, if revealed, could create, stimulate, or increase international tensions in such manner as to impair the conduct of United States foreign policies.

- (3) Information that could identify or otherwise disclose intelligence agency activities conducted or planned abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives, and planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly; or information that could reveal support provided to such activities.
 - (4) Information that could reveal that the United States has obtained, or seeks to obtain, certain data or materials of intelligence interest from or concerning a foreign nation, organization, or group when the disclosure of such effort could adversely affect United States relations with or activities in a foreign country.
 - (5) Intelligence information that, if disclosed, could lead to political or economic instability, or to civil disorder or unrest, in a foreign country or could jeopardize the lives, liberty, or property of United States citizens residing in or visiting such a country or could endanger United States Government personnel or installations there.
- e. Scientific, Technological, or Economic Matters Relating to the National Security
- (1) Intelligence information that provides the United States with a scientific, technical, engineering or economic advantage of value to the national security.
 - (2) Information concerning research of a scientific or technical nature leading to the development of special techniques, procedures, equipment and equipment configurations, or systems, and their use in the collection or production of foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence.
 - (3) Information dealing with the research and development, operational planning, deployment, or use of scientific and technical devices, equipment, or techniques used for intelligence purposes by an Intelligence Community agency jointly with, or through the cooperation of, other United States or foreign commercial, institutional, or governmental entities.


f. United States Government Programs for Safeguarding Nuclear Materials or Facilities

Information on foreign nuclear programs, activities, capabilities, technologies, facilities, plans and intentions, weapons and their deployment that could disclose the nature, scope, or effectiveness of United States intelligence efforts to monitor nuclear developments abroad or could cause such efforts to fail or be restricted in a manner detrimental to national security.


g. Other Categories of Information Related to National Security and Determined by an agency head to Require Protection Against Unauthorized Disclosure

- (1) Information the release of which could be expected to place an individual in immediate jeopardy.

(Other categories may be added later.)



30 NOV 1978



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Document Classification

1. Action Requested: That you sign the attached memorandum for the NFIB on Executive Order 12065.

2. Background: The President signed Executive Order 12065 on National Security Information on 28 June 1978 and established standards that must be met for material to be classified. The driving force behind the Order was to strike an appropriate balance between the public's right to government information and the government's need to protect information which needs to be kept secret. You, as head of the Intelligence Community, have statutory responsibility to protect intelligence activities, sources and methods which must be kept classified. Also, you have, by commissioning the Vogt study, taken special cognizance of the need to get more intelligence information to consumers without sacrificing proper security needs.

3. The Executive Order is to become effective on 1 December 1978 and it is believed appropriate that you remind the NFIB members that you expect full compliance with both the letter and spirit of the Executive Order.

4. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum to the NFIB.

/s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake

Attachment


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
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Robert W. Gambino
Chairman, DCI Security Committee

28 Mar 1978
Date

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD



21 DEC 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Document Classification

1. With respect to the implementation of Executive Order 12065 on National Security Information, I would like to remind you of the President's words when he signed the Order on 28 June 1978. "While some material must be classified, the government classifies too much information, classifies it too highly, and for too long." These practices violate the public's right to know, impose unnecessary costs, and weaken protection for truly sensitive information by undermining respect for all classification.

2. The Community is currently reviewing its compartmentation programs. As we strive toward a new, simpler and more efficient system, one of our most urgent goals is to ensure that more information is published in collateral channels to make it more readily available to consumers. Compartmented systems are to be reserved solely for the protection of information or sources of highest sensitivity.

3. However, I want to ensure that we, as a Community, do not wait for a new system to be promulgated before we attack the root problem. I would remind you that the Executive Order requires that degrees of "identifiable" damage must be established before classifying material. This term was inserted to tighten standards for classification and to make classifiers' decisions more thoughtful and less automatic. Particularly in compartmented systems, there has been a tendency to classify materials at the Top Secret level almost by rote when, with a little thought, they could be issued either at a lower level and, in some cases, in collateral channels.

4. By a separate memorandum I am publishing guidance on what intelligence material qualifies for classification protection. I would anticipate that, in the preparation of specific classification guides, each Agency, Department and

Program Manager will critically analyze those categories of information to be classified and that classification levels and periods of classification protection will be reasonable and responsive to the public's right to know but still within the demands of our need to protect true secrets.

5. I intend to personally review classification patterns exercised within the Intelligence Community as we enter the implementation phase of Executive Order 12065. I expect all members of the Community to follow both the letter and spirit of the Order, not only because it expresses the desires of the President, but because it will enable us to do our job better.

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER
Chairman

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